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ABSTRACT: The relationship between the European radical left and democracy has come into attention due 
to the electoral surges of some such parties and their participation in government. Its scrutiny, however, 
remains ambivalent, at a time contemporary democracies are experiencing historic disruptions affecting how 
people engage with parties. This study offers an organisational perspective of the European radical left in 
order to map out and elaborate on patterns of democratic practice in this party family, as measured against 
a broadly liberal benchmark. Using a modified version of the internal party democracy (IPD) index 
developed by Rahat and Shapira (2017), the study compares fifteen parliamentary radical left parties (RLPs) 
from eleven European countries – Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Spain – across the dimensions of participation, representation, 
competition, responsiveness and transparency. Specifically, the study outlines patterns across the IPD 
dimensions and investigates the extent of variation within the party family, juxtaposing it against ideological 
and structural distinctions among RLPs. 
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Recent scholarship offers mixed signals about the relationship between contemporary 
European radical left parties (RLPs) and liberal democracy. In an attempt to empirically specify 
interpretations of the left’s relationship with democracy from an organisational perspective, this 
article responds to the following three research questions: What is the fortune of internal party 
democracy (IPD) in today’s European radical left parliamentary parties and what kind of 
Work licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non 
commercial-Share alike 3.0 Italian License 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 14(1) 2021: 411-434, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v14i1p411 
variation exists among them? Do ideological (versus structural) features matter in accounting for 
this variation? How do theoretical dimensions or principles of IPD play out on the European 
radical left and why? These questions in turn arise from the relevant debates on left radicalism 
and aim to clear some of the ambivalence about RLPs among analysts, by articulating the 
organisational side of the story.  
Contemporary European RLPs are those to the left of mainstream social democracy, with a 
Marxist or post-Marxist heritage, espousing an egalitarian, internationalist, largely anti-neoliberal 
or anti-capitalist orientation (March and Mudde 2005). In addressing them, authors call attention 
to left-wing populism as an ‘illiberal democratic’ force with a personalistic appeal embodied by a 
charismatic and powerful leadership voicing demagogic discourse (e.g. Kriesi and Pappas 2015; 
Mudde 2015). Many comparativists also treat parts of the radical left – the revolutionary and 
orthodox communist left – as an ‘extreme left’. This party family is also often categorised as 
‘anti-establishment parties’ (Abedi 2004), which are mostly critical but sometimes subversive and 
transformational opposite liberal democracy (March 2011). Caamaño and Casal Bertoa (2020) 
argue that ‘the higher the strength of these parties, the lower the level of liberal democracy’. 
Many analyses however emphasise the pluralism, openness to social movements and internal 
democracy in some RLPS – notably the most recent electoral spearheads, such as the Greek 
SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) before its incumbency and the Spanish Podemos (We 
Can). It is argued that this boils down to their often special relationship with social and protest 
movements, their radical democratic imaginaries and their emancipatory aim (e.g. Chironi and 
Fittipaldi 2017). Some authors identify certain RLPs as ‘Populist Radical Left Parties’ and 
emphasise the centrality of inclusion in its politics (Katsambekis and Kioupkiolis 2019; Damiani 
2019). In attempting to ‘democratise democracy’, these parties are considered as hesitant towards 
representation. Rather seeking to reclaim sovereignty and instill communal decision-making as a 
fundamental practice in democracy (Damiani 2019, p. 303).  
Similar claims were made about left-libertarian parties in the 1970s and 1980s, which operated 
on the intent to democratise the socialist movement and infuse it with the New Social 
Movements’ spirit (e.g. Kitschelt 1988). Particularly voters on the left who are young may exhibit 
disregard for the typified features of bureaucratic operation and the delegation of representatives, 
seeking direct and fast political gratification (Polletta 2014). Others highlight instances of left 
populist discourse in history which have been de-centralised as well as personalistic, movement-
based, union-based or party-based; thus qualifying the category of a new populist strain that is 
more inclusive (Charalambous and Ioannou 2019). 
At the most basic level, how does this tension-ridden and disputed relationship of radicals with 
democracy as recorded in the literature translate today in terms of the conduct of their own 
partisan affairs? The intention here is a contribution to the above debates about the radical left 
and democracy, through an investigation not of the discourse, programmatic profiles, or the 
voters of Europe’s RLPs, but rather their own organisational practice. Above all, we aim at 
showing if and how so the various manifestations of illiberalism exhibited by RLPs manifest 
themselves in party organisation. IPD is an instantiation of democratic practice within the format 
of political parties. Parties are the ‘primary organisational vehicles of electoral democracy’ and 
thus ‘are themselves judged in terms of their democratic character’ (Carty 2013, p.11). This 
character then, should entail and be judged upon the very principles of the electoral process.  
Our contribution can clarify various issues at stake in discussions on the pathologies and 
enemies of democracy: populism as a new phenomenon on the radical left, suspected tensions 
between representation and participation, organisational narratives of democracy and parties, and 
social movements as alternatives to politics as usual. To advance research in this direction, the 
core argument here is three-fold: the radical left is not an illiberal political force in party 
operational terms; there is some variation in terms of IPD that mostly has ideological roots; 
dynamics between principles of IPD among RLPs are also largely explained by ideological 
features and there is no evident conflict between participation and representation. To arrive here, 
 
 
a modified version of the IPD index developed by Gideon Rahat and Assaf Shapira (2017) was 
applied to fifteen European radical left parties from eleven countries – the Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and 
Spain – across the dimensions of participation, representation, competition, responsiveness and 
transparency.  
The next section formulates four hypotheses that drive the empirical analysis and investigate 
the overall degree and extent of variation in IPD within the radical left in Europe. Next, the study 
presents and justifies a slightly modified form of the Rahat and Shapira index. The following, 
empirical section lays out the data, inspecting the hypotheses. The conclusions summarise the 
findings and briefly consider the implications of the analysis. 
 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses: Internal party democracy and the radical 
left  
 
The research questions – the fortune of IPD among RLPs, the relationships between IPD 
principles and potential explanations for these –, tap directly into debates over party organisation 
and its relevance in empirical and theoretical writings about democracy; particularly, a 
generalised investigation into patterns and conditions of IPD (see Bolin et al. 2017). To formulate 
hypotheses out of our research questions, thus requires connecting the theory of party 
organisation and IPD with radical left ideology and diversity up to today. 
Initially, democracy figured prominently in communist theory. Lenin’s What is to be done 
(1902) was precisely about this at the level of the revolutionary party. Accordingly, intra-party 
democracy is indispensible when conditions allow it to fully and fruitfully develop, but it can be 
tampered, constrained and modified, if it is not possible in revolutionary conditions. Above all, 
intra-party democracy, according to Lenin always entailed free ideas and arguments, 
unconstrained by petty interests and superstition. both In the 1970s, Eurocommunist 
argumentation valorised democratisation of the state and society (see Balampanidis 2019).  The 
political milieus of the left are also mobilised via attitudes towards democracy; for example, the 
political instincts of RLP voters are aroused by authoritarian practice and heritage (Visser et al. 
2014). In Political Man (1960), Seymour Martin Lipset posited that across the two types of 
political values –economic liberalism opposite convervatism and authoritarianism opposite 
libertarianism – the working class is economically conservative but liberal in non-economic 
terms. Concurrently, manifesto data suggest that socialist and communist parties pay lip service 
to democracy more often than rightwing parties (Volkens 2001, 106). 
High variation in IPD across the party family, in terms of overall degree and across 
dimensions, would reveal a group of actors where the overarching ideological core does not 
guarantee a high or low level of democracy or a specific type of democracy. In other words, 
ideology would not be reflected in organisation, in accordance with Robert Michel’s famous ‘iron 
law of oligarchy’ and subsequent research (Bolin et al. 2017, 164-165). Radical left ideology and 
thought would not carry the legitimacy of an organisational framework tying together the whole 
of the party family and under which democracy is guaranteed to the same extent or in the same 
way. Ideological schisms of a historical nature or the structural characteristics of the party body 
may direct variation across typological divides.  
Due to the universe of RLPs being relatively plural in terms of organisational practice 
historically speaking, we expect multiple differences between parties in terms of degree of IPD, 
both in total and in particular dimensions. But given RLPs have diachronically been parties which 
operate for many decades now in established liberal democracies, frequently sought government 
office, posit democracy as one of their central ideological features, and have been influenced by 
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social movements and their bottom-up perspectives on politics (Smith 2016; Della Porta 2013), 
we can hypothesise that: 
 
H (1) While RLPs exhibit variation between them in IPD, they are on average a significantly 
democratic party family, in accordance with the predominant standards of liberal democracy. 
 
Engaging with the resonance of party ideological and structural features raised in the literature 
as potentially conditioning variation in IPD, our next hypothesis addresses whether and how the 
ideological/ideational and organisational/structural ‘determinism’ supported by some theories of 
intra-party politics yet rejected by others, holds explanatory power in the case of RLPs (see 
Scarrow and Webb 2017, 15). Still, to transpose intra-family ideological or organisational 
distinctions to the domain of IPD, one can differentiate between principles (or the dimensions) of 
democracy. Participatory and responsive procedures have never really divided leftist thought and 
practice, it was rather centralisation (not measured directly in this paper for reasons explained 
further down) representation and competition. Primarily, it is here that there exist distinct schools 
and traditions within the left.  
In the whole of the radical left family, responsiveness has been a constant, especially if 
procedurally narrowed down to decisions about policy and government, and frequent 
representative bodies’ meetings. Both the communists and the reformed or new left parties have 
held intense internal debates about government participation, which often involved the party 
members as well (see Olsen et al. 2010). As concerns transparency, Marxism-Leninism was 
conspiratorial and therefore somewhat non-transparent. On the other hand, all RLPs have 
diachronically published their materials and deliberations. For example, the class and 
demographic composition of newly elected central committees in communist parties have been 
systematically published in their Congress proceedings. Moreover, both participation and 
responsiveness have never been a theoretical problem for radicals, as an inherent feature of their 
worldview is militant engagement with politics. Party congresses in the broad socialist tradition 
have been key moments of deliberation, intellectual fervent, as well as power struggle, often 
ritualised and celebrated subsequently. 
At the same time, RLPs, especially those of the communist type, do not adhere to a model of 
‘descriptive representation’, whereby representatives ought to reflect those they represent 
demographically. In the communist tradition this is not seen as necessary for ensuring substantive 
representation. That is, the regulated presence of women or young or immigrant representatives 
does not condition policy in their interests (see Lovenduski and Norris 2003). Competitive 
behaviour has also been diachronically suppressed in the communist tradition especially, which 
dismissed it as a bourgeois ideological principle, useful for dividing the working class. Instead, 
comradeship was said to necessarily guide socialist struggle. Democratic centralism denoted 
internal discussion and contestation, to be followed by submission to the majority once 
concluded. This, however, could easily slip into unchallenged leaderships or expelled reformers; 
communist leaders enjoyed long tenures and (often) unquestioned obedience (e.g. Waller 1981). 
For red-green, democratic socialist and other New Left formations, the point was different: 
that left-wing politics is ‘a continual process’, which necessitates ‘collusion’ and ‘alliances’, ‘a 
praxis of micro-power’, as opposed to the development of macro-strategies revolving around the 
party as the chief agent (Tormey 2005). The libertarian ethos and post-materialist perspective 
(known as ‘new politics’) of many on the New Left since the 1960s valued competition greatly, 
and thought it to be a chief distinguishing element of alternative organisational practice compared 
to the archetypical, ‘monolithic’, communist or socialist party. Competition also manifested into 
critiques of democratic centralism and the male, communist leader, among other attributes of 
established (western and Eastern) communism.  
A more pluralist organisation would be more reflective and representative of the diverse 
opinions among citizens with socialist allegiances, rather than allowing for the easy imposition of 
 
 
a common framework. And given diversity and pluralism the party should also be, by nature, 
sufficiently competitive. The legacy and fault lines of the 1960s and 1970s generated left-
libertarian and democratic socialist forces. Activists in these parties embraced ‘thinking for 
oneself instead of becoming enslaved to a particular line’ (Tormey 2005). Our hypothesis in 
terms of factors conditioning differences in IPD among RLPs is, therefore, ideologically (and 
historically) specified rather than generalised across the various aspects of democracy: 
 
H (2) The ideological heritage and profile of RLPs, especially the distinction between orthodox 
parties and democratic socialists (new left or red-green), is associated with differentiated levels 
of IPD, specifically representation and competition. 
 
The research questions posed here also tap into debates over political party organisation and 
its relevance for IPD. Membership strength, for example, has been assumed to influence IPD. 
One can argue that the oligarchic tendencies identified by scholars like Robert Michels (1962 
[1911]), can more easily prevail ‘in larger organisations’, where ‘the need for large-scale 
bureaucracy is more pressing’ (Bolin et al. 2017,166). To manage the activity of diverse members 
and ensure a certain degree of internal cohesion, leaderships of large and strong parties may have 
incentives to centralise power around them, effectively limiting various manifestations of internal 
democratic practice, such as competition, or even transparency. By contrast, small memberships 
may enrich the participatory and deliberative aspects of IPD. This may be because smaller groups 
of members may enjoy the opportunity to engage more extensively and meaningfully in party life 
(Allern and Pedersen 2007). But the outcome will likely be determined also by the space afforded 
to the base by the party elites. 
On the other hand, both small and large RLPs would have incentives, like most parties, to get 
across to the public a democratic image (see Young 2013, 72-74), especially today that the mass 
party is gone. Parties with similar membership sizes operate via different party models, which 
influence IPD accordingly. Also, organisations of small or large sizes (for example as measured 
by membership strength (density)) are witnessed in both the ‘more democratic’, reformed or new, 
RLPs, and the ‘less democratic’, traditional communist parties. Membership size is being largely 
shaped by meso- and macro-level environmental factors, such as apathy, de-politicisation or the 
pre-eminence of the cartel party (Van Haute and Gauja 2017).  
Another feature of parties that may influence IPD is the structure of the party body – unitary 
or coalition/factional party. Factions and tendencies in political parties perform functions, 
including mobilising participation in party affairs, the articulation of issue-oriented interests and 
the representation of certain groups (Beller and Belloni 1978).  Nevertheless, as per H(2), 
factional and coalition parties have been the product of particular, ideological responses to 
political developments (see Balibar 2017). By the turn of the 1980s, parties which explicitly 
rejected Soviet socialism and revised or abandoned the Leninist version of the revolutionary party 
were more open to diverse bodies and engaged in processes of ‘refoundation’, ‘renewal’ and 
national roads to perestroika. By the late 1990s, the coalition or factional party became very 
popular among newly established forces, but it has been vehemently rejected in the Marxist-
Leninist parliamentary parties. Altogether, we arrive at the following, two-fold hypothesis, 
concerning the influence of party structural features on IPD on the European radical left: 
 
H (3a) Membership strength is not likely to be associated with IPD in RLPs. 
H(3b) Whether RLPs are unitary or coalition parties is not likely to be associated with IPD, but 
rather with ideological traditions.  
 
On the radical left, ideological traditions are loosely associated with particular strategic 
perspectives and in turn connect to the structural characteristics of party organisation. Coalition 
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parties are de facto ideologically more libertarian than unitary parties, organisational culture 
derives from ideological tradition. Marxists diverge foremostly on organisational questions, 
whether how to address nationalist movements, as concerns unions or for parties. At bottom this 
has been the schism between the Anarchist versus Social Democratic traditions. Here lies a 
tension between horizontal or vertical lines of thinking mobilisation (see Prentoulis and 
Thomassen 2020, 345); inclusive-cooperative collectives with distinct-undivided partisaship, or 
autonomous partisanship respectively.  
Lastly, we are interested in the relationship between different dimensions of IPD and by 
extension the potential conflict between distinct democratic values on the European radical left. 
For national-level democracy, dimensionality is a complex issue with a long history that begins 
with the designation by Robert Dahl (1971) of polyarchy’s two dimensions – contestation and 
participation. Overall, research literature has suggested repeatedly that IPD dimensions may come 
into conflict between them. Rahat et al. (2008) found empirical evidence that parties are unlikely 
to maximise inclusiveness, competitive processes and representativeness. In particular, they 
found that the most inclusive parties exhibited less capacity of representation and indicated only 
medium levels of competition. Participation in candidate selection can inhibit pluralist 
representation (Rahat 2009). As Rahat et al. (2008, 667) explain the mechanism in operation 
creating a reverse relationship between participation and representation, unlike party members 
who exercise individual preferences in their vote of nominees, ‘members of a party committee are 
asked to construct the overall list of candidates that they think have the best chance of 
maximising the party’s vote’. 
By contrast, Rahat and Shapira (2017) in their empirical study of Israeli parties found that 
parties can be simultaneously democratic in various dimensions, including participation. At the 
same time, based on more detailed findings, the authors theorised that participation, competition 
and responsiveness are dimensions that reflect power distribution between different structures 
within the party (or between the leadership and the rest). While representation and transparency, 
on the other hand, are not expected to feed into the contestation of leadership power and should 
be less related to the other dimensions than these other dimensions are related between 
themselves (Rahat and Shapira 2017, 99).  
IPD dimensions can come into tension for RLPs for similar reasons as for all other parties. 
Our general expectation is thus that RLPs can be more democratic in some dimensions and less 
democratic in others. But as already explained different historical strains of radical left thought 
faced certain principles of democracy from their own distinct viewpoint. The New Left which 
emerged in the 1960s and upon which the majority of contemporary RLPs have gradually come 
to model their internal practices, combined the radical democratic spirit of the critics of 
representative institutions back then – which promoted wider participation (sic. inclusion), direct 
democracy and criticism of centralist structures –, with the feminist appeal that supplanted radical 
organisations with a heightened sensitivity over the issue of women’s representation and identity 
politics. Hence, non-orthodox, or non-traditional RLPs did not view representation as something 
which would be damaged by wider inclusion, and did consider competition (at base, pluralism) an 
important driving mechanism for representation. Meanwhile for the communists competition 
would damage working class interest representation and could breed ‘opportunism’ into the party 
or fuel instability, while minority rights were not ideologically inscribed in their doctrines and 
quotas would limit flexibility by the leadership.  
Consequently, the relationship between separate IPD dimensions can also be connected to 
specific strains within the party family. Assuming that ideology is important in this respect of 
inter-dimensional relations in IPD, we thus expect, as our final hypothesis, that: 
 
H (4) The operation of RLPs does not preclude being more democratic in one or more dimensions 
and less democratic in the others, but any associations between dimensions is likely to reflect 




3. Operationalising IPD: Measurement and data collection 
 
As democracy itself is still a contested concept both within and between distinct ideological 
traditions, there naturally exist competing approaches towards the operationalisation of IPD. The 
Rahat and Shapira index, which is utilised in this study, is built on the basis of distinct democratic 
principles as reflected in key procedures:  
 
• Participation: Without participation in the affairs of a state or party, the organisation will 
lack legitimacy because it will manifest only limited inclusiveness and so breed elitism 
rather than polyarchy (Dahl 1971). The participatory school teaches that parties are 
instruments for member activism; democratic citizenship is not only about voting, but 
also about taking part in decision-making and debates within the contours of democratic 
organisations (Pateman 2012). With participation comes also a greater sense of belonging 
and commitments to rights as benefits that are fundamental for citizenship (Bellamy 
2001), what Dahl (1998) called ‘enlightened understanding’. Through the index, three 
procedures through the public or party members can or cannot influence decision-making 
are examined: candidate and leadership selection as processes for selecting the chief 
decision-makers (e.g. Verba et al. 1995); participation in ideological discussions, about 
policy, identity or ideology; and the exercise of influence on the party election platform 
(Gauja 2013).  
 
• Representation: With the starting point being that delegation of authority is unavoidable 
in any reasonably sized group, as well as desirable for shared interests (Landemore 2017, 
59), representation is a mechanism through which the various groups in society are 
offered access to government. For parties, representation reflects an organisation’s 
tendency to include in its key positions a variety of social groups. A key indicator in the 
literature concerns women’s representation, but one can also search beyond gender and 
into other social groups as well, such as the young, immigrants, senior citizens, or 
residents of a geographical periphery (Schmitter and Karl 2001).  
 
• Competition: An idea rooted in the Schumpeterian conception of democracy is that voters 
can choose between several alternatives (see Schumpeter 1942). Competition is 
traditionally attributed great importance in the literature about state-level democracy 
because it contributes significantly to other democratic principles, such as responsiveness 
and accountability (Rahat 2009; Schmitter and Karl 2001). The index measures this 
dimension by asking if a party maintains competition for key positions: specifically, party 
leader and parliamentary nominees. 
 
• Responsiveness: Being responsive to voters or members is a prerequisite of bottom-up 
democratic practice, which assumes that all legitimacy lies in the demos (the people) 
(Powell 2004). Hence, representatives serve the function of delegates and need to be 
responsive to the demands of the represented (Hazan and Rahat 2010). A systematic way 
to gauge party responsiveness is to ‘address the ability of the party institutions to 
influence the party’s representatives in the legislative and executive branches’. In this 
vein, the index examines how frequently the party representative bodies meet and their 
influence in important matters: namely, selecting cabinet ministers, joining and leaving 
the government and policy-making (Rahat and Shapira 2017). 
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• Transparency: Only by having information about their representatives can a public hold 
them into account, cast a rational vote, and be interested in public affairs (Hollyer et al. 
2011; Dahl 1998). Transparency as measured in the index captures the online availability 
of information about the party, its composition and its activities and deliberations – either 
on the party’s website or its Facebook page. 
 
Each IPD dimension as identified above was ascribed weight that reflected its relative 
significance in the literature on state-level democracy – 30 points for participation, 20 for 
representation and competition, respectively, and 15 for responsiveness and transparency, 
respectively. Since this choice, as Rahat and Shapira (2017, 95) noted, is somewhat arbitrary, the 
index was recalculated under the assumption that all dimensions carry equal weight. Like with 
Rahat and Shapira, the overall results are not much apart from the initial findings. Therefore, the 
proceeding analysis would not have been significantly different if equal weight was attributed to 
all dimensions. 
A score was given to items for each dimension, totaling an aggregate score between 0 points 
(the complete lack of IPD) and 100 points (the highest possible level). The index was 
nevertheless not utilised as given. An expert survey, intended as a pilot study, was carried out 
based on a slightly modified form of the Rahat and Shapira index. The initial modification was 
undertaken in order to make the index applicable to a multiplicity of settings, beyond the Israeli 
case, to which the index was initially applied. The pilot study asked experts/informants 
(academics who have published on the party and/or are/have been involved in the party) to 
provide a score for each question and any comments they consider necessary.  
Two or three experts were used for each party in this phase. Out of the disagreements, 
questions and comments that emerged, the questionnaire was adjusted and the scoring method 
was recalibrated. Indicatively, experts’ disagreements, comments and information led to 
specifying further the scoring for several items, which was done by the original index: for 
example, factoring in types of gender quotas, scoring for allowing party friends to participate in 
internal, organisational procedures and considering the various types of policy and ideological 
debates in which party members and others can participate. The final version of the index is 
summarised in Table 1. The full wording of the items, scales, sources and scoring specifications 
are presented in the online Appendix A. 
The process of data collection was based on the modified questions and primary research was 
undertaken for each party. Research involved a variety of sources: secondary literature; the 
constitutions and statutes of the parties, databases such as the PPDB (Political Party Data Base); 
the parties’ websites and media reports, national or party newspapers and parliamentary websites. 
Each party was assigned a score as of 1 May 2019. The judgment of some of the experts was 
overridden when the empirical information collected overall pointed to a different score than that 
of the expert during the index pilot test. Sometimes, the primary data collection included second 
(and third) contact with experts, to inquire for further insights. All scores were assigned by the 
author, according to the criteria specified in the online Appendix A. Table 1 also reports the 
specific sources upon which coding for each item was premised. 
The choice of this index, as opposed to other existing ones such as that of the PPDB (see Von 
dem Berge and Poguntke 2017), was made for three reasons, both particular to this study’s 
research questions and generic. First, the index reflects a broadly liberal understanding of party 
democracy, thereby allowing us to address the argument about an ‘illiberal left’ by measuring 
‘performance’ against liberal democracy’s own standards. In treating the index as a liberal 
measure (and reasoning) of IPD, which diverges, for example from radical democratic traditions, 
such as the Bolshevik, the Fabian, the anarcho-syndicalist, or the post-structuralist, the theoretical 
assumption at the core of the authors’ index is key. As they write: ‘in a democratic party, the 
relationship between the public, the party institutions and the party’s representatives in the 
 
 
government branches … are founded upon principles that are similar to those on which parallel 
institutions of the democratic state are based’ (Rahat and Shapira 2017, 86). 
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Strictly based on defining the degree of IPD by the inclusiveness of key procedures, the 
authors identify a sub-category of ‘open plebiscitary intra-party democracy (OPIPD)’, which 
translates into the ideal of non-members participating in party decisions. This variant of IPD 
departs from the dominant approaches to party democracy driven by conceptualising the party as 
an organisation with clearly defined boundaries; as in the Leninist and Gramscian traditions, for 
example. Accordingly, RLPs are assessed against the strictest standards of liberal democracy. 
This allows one to rigorously test the claim of ‘illiberalism’ from an organisational perspective. 
But it also raises several qualifications as regards the relationship between RLPs and IPD (or 
democracy) writ large.  
Secondly, the Rahat and Shapira (2017) index is multi-dimensional, with dimensions 
corresponding to the key principles of democratic theory as they translate into procedures. This 
avoids the reductionism entailed in conceptualisations of IPD based exclusively on inclusiveness 
in internal decision-making procedures, such as candidate and leadership selection. Focusing only 
on inclusiveness would reflect excessive emphasis on certain democratic theories (e.g. direct 
democracy or deliberation) at the cost of other values (Borz and Janda 2018, 4). Third, it would 
also not allow addressing the puzzle of whether different principles of democracy can be 
simultaneously achieved, or if (and how) they collide. The index addresses issues of both formal 
rule as found in statutes and other documents, and actually experienced organisational practice. In 
this way, it achieves addressing issues of responsiveness and transparency, which cannot be 
gauged by measures relying on statutory provisions alone. 
The comparisons are based on 15 cases and although the universe of parliamentary RLPS in 
Western Europe is not much bigger than that, the selected parties are still a sample of the total 
population. The sample selection of RLPs was based on the guiding research questions and more 
specifically intended to cover the radical left political space in its entire breadth and thus cater for 
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variability in terms of party ideological and organisational profiles as these tap into the theoretical 
distinctions drawn out in the previous section: ideological ones, including an alleged populist 
profile, and diverging party organisations in terms of size, structure and unity. The sample also 




4. An empirical analysis of IPD among fifteen European RLPs 
 
This section of the study outlines and seeks to explain patterns of IPD inside European RLPs. The 
final scores are presented in Table 2, which ranks the parties under consideration according to 
their IPD scores, from highest to lowest and Table 3 which shows the scores per party by IPD 
dimension and in total. Looking at the figures there is support for the first hypothesis (H1). With 
the classification of Rahat and Shapira (2017) in mind –  parties that receive scores ranging from 
61 to 100 as ‘democratic’, parties scoring 30–60 points as ‘partly democratic’, and parties below 
30 points as ‘non-democratic’ – the European radical left is comfortably a democratic group. Its 
average (76.7%) is well above the minimal point of the top category). Although these parties are 
often suspect of illiberalism, they themselves share liberal democratic organisational principles. 
Hence, this party family is certainly not an illiberal democratic force in terms of partisan practice. 
Applying to this space epithets such as ‘extreme’ sounds out of place inasmuch the very operation 
of RLPs manifests the widely common procedures of liberal democracy at the state level. 
European RLPs score high on average across participation (average=83%), responsiveness 
(average=83%), transparency (average=86%) and competition (average=83%), and low in the 
dimension of representation (average=54%). The latter score is largely due to the absence of soft 
or strong quotas on immigrants, senior citizens, the youth or (sometimes) women; across various 
parties, it also reflects low levels of women representation inside parliament. RLPs overall exhibit 
limited sensitivities in what concerns the representation of: a) integral groups for all parties, such 
as senior citizens and (to a lesser extent) young people; b) prominent social groups that deserve 
representation in the political system, such as, immigrants or ethnic minorities. The counter-
weight of identity politics (as we will see further down) has played into the opposite direction 
within parties of the New Left type, but on average, descriptive representation among RLPs is not 
impressive. Where it is strong, it does not usually go beyond two or (rarely) three groups, at least 
in terms of formal quotas. In any case, however, the index provides a very strong test for 
representation that very few parties across the world pass with excellent scores. So while RLPs do 
not perform highly in the index, it is unlikely that they lack behind in relation to most parties in 
other party families. 
Also in accordance with the first hypotheses (H1), there is some variation among the parties. 
A total of nearly 30 points separates the first from the last party and a total of 26 points separates 
the average of the first three parties from the average of the last three parties (s.d=9.2%). 
Evidently, to an extent the diversity of the European radical left (e.g. March and Mudde 2005) is 
partly an organisational issue. A close look at Table 2, suggests that most of this variation 
revolves around the dimensions of representation and competition. Some parties exhibit a very 
low tendency of crafting representative electoral lists, while others a very high one. For some 
parties there has not been a competitive leadership contest since the penultimate general election. 
Across participation, responsiveness and transparency, there are fewer differences between the 
parties under consideration. Variance is much lower and the average much higher. These are the 










Table 2 IPD ranking of fifteen European radical left parties (as of 1 May 2019) 
Party IPD Score (%) 
VAS 90.5 
Red-Green Alliance  90.5 
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Table 3 IPD among 12 European radical left parties, in total and by dimension (as of May 2019).                                                
Source: The table is constructed on the basis of the index questions and scores have been assigned in accordance with 
the criteria described in Appendix A.
  Participation 
(out of 30) 
Representation 
(out of 20) 
Competition 
(out of 20) 
Responsiveness 
(out of 15) 
Transparency 




Cyprus AKEL 24.5 5 10 15 11.5 66 
Czech Rep. KSCM 24.5 10 20 11 14 79.5 
Denmark 
    Finland 
R-Gr. All 
VAS 
24                                        
26.5 
15                                             
14 
20                        
20 
15                                              
15 
14.5                            
15 



























































































Table 4 allows us to consider whether and how ideological and structural distinctions can 
account for the above mentioned variation. For the purposes of analysing the relevance of 
ideology, or rather ideological tradition within the broadness of left radicalism, as formulated in 
our second hypothesis (H2), two existing typologies of RLPs were utilised; those by Escalona and 
Vieira (2012) and Gomez et al. (2016). Based on Escalona and Viera (2012), one can distinguish 
between left of social democracy, red-green, and orthodox, communist (Marxist-Leninist) parties 
(respectively Die Linke, IU, PG and SP; SYRIZA, VAS, SV, Bloco and Red-Green Alliance; 
AKEL, PCP, KKE), effectively juxtaposing an ‘orthodox’ logic with two more ideologically 
‘modernised’ ones. Similarly, Gomez et. al.’s (2016) distinction between ‘traditional’ RLPs 
(KKE, AKEL, PCF PCP, SP, SYRIZA) and ‘new left’ parties (IU, Podemos, VAS, PG, SV, Red-
Green Alliance, Die Linke and Bloco) argues that a key division within the party family is 
emphasis on so called ‘post-materialist’ issues. Empirically driven towards their definition, the 
authors analysed 19 CMP (Comparative Manifesto Project) items to argue that RLPs differ 
between them mainly on ‘new politics’. 
 
        Table 4 IPD on the European radical left and party-level characteristics (in %) 
 Ideology Organisation 












Participation 83.8/81.6/81.6 83.7/81.4 85.4/81.1 -0.083 
 
Representation 65/61.2/36.6 68.3/40.7 70/39.4 -0.278 
 
Competition 89.3/87.5/50 94/71.4 91.7/75 0.094 
 
Responsiveness 86.6/75/82.2 86.6/78.8 84.8/80.8 -0.133 
 
Transparency 83.8/84.2/76.6 86.3/86.1 88.6/84.2 0.264 
 
Total 81.7/77.9/65.4 83.7/71.5 84.1/72.1  
Note: In bold, non-overlapping 95% CI for bootstrap samples means. In grey, slightly overlapping 95% CI 
for bootstrap sample means. The analysis of bootstrap confidence intervals is available upon request. 
*The parties included in the first two typologies (first and second column) are only those addressed in the 
typologies used: Escalona and Vieira (2012) and Gomez et al. (2016), respectively, plus the KSCM for the 
latter typology. 
**Pearson’s Correlation, p, 0.05. Membership strength is calculated by dividing the number of party 
members by the number of total party members in the country. Data from Chiocchetti (2017), except for 
the Red-Green Alliance and SV, see Van Haute and Gauja (2017). Podemos is excluded due to near non-
existent membership boundaries. 
 
We can see from Table 4 whether the above-mentioned distinctions are relevant if there is a 
significant difference between the means of each identified radical left party type. To validate that 
the differences between the averages in the comparisons of Table 4 have not occurred by chance, 
bootstrap confidence intervals (CI, 95%) are used in the analysis (given the distribution of the 
respective samples and populations is not normal) (Wood 2005). 
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Overall, there are no significant differences between RLPs as regards total IPD scores. The 
major differences are to be found in the IPD dimensions of representation and (and to a lesser 
extent) competition, although for competition the relationship is strictly speaking not statistically 
significant. Communists have not traditionally mobilised upon the logic of representation but 
rather on the vanguardist logic of leading the working class and the people in their struggle. Their 
social milieus and leaderships were certainly less exposed to the feminist wave and identity 
politics that came to define the New Left and has traditionally been less associated with Marxism-
Leninism. In terms of competition, this is limited in all three communist parties – AKEL, KKE, 
PCP –, essentially, because they score low on the criterion of having had competitive elections 
for the party leader since the penultimate elections.  
Again, there is a discernable historical pattern here: leadership alternation was always a 
relatively uncommon practice in west European communism, as well as, evidently, in Soviet 
politics. Yet, a low score on competition is not an exclusive element of the communist type of 
RLP. The same situation is also exhibited by parties such as SYRIZA (in government at the time 
of scoring, thus with disincentive, perhaps, to change its leader). Or the PG, where leader, Jean-
Luc Melenchon’s persona and electoral strategy has been effectively unquestioned since the 
organisation’s establishment; and especially after its involvement in the creation of France 
Insoumise, the mobilisation platform in support of Melenchon’s presidential candidacies in 2012 
and 2017 (see Tierno 2018). 
On participation the differences between the two groups appear to be minor and in this sense, 
Marxist-Leninist parties, diachronically accused of centralised, bordering to tyrannical, 
leadership, lacking transparency and constantly under threat for policy drift, are even by 
mainstream standards democratic parties. In empirical terms, therefore, being Marxist-Leninist in 
2019 and operating through democratic centralist organisational practices is considerably in line 
with the basic standards of liberal democracy; although it can certainly not be reduced to, or fully 
explained by, these standards. A note of caution is that centralisation is not fully taken into 
consideration by the index. Some scholars suggest that it shouldn’t because inclusiveness can be 
combined with centralisation to the extent that these two elements of party organisational practice 
partly involve different types of procedures (Borz and Janda 2018). At the same time, the 
democratic centralism of traditional communist parties has mostly been manifested in terms of 
informal practice, corruption by secretive apparatchiks, or through strict disciplinary mechanisms, 
or many member commitments, which do not necessarily counteract on participatory politics, 
responsiveness or a transparent organisation in a formal procedural sense.  
Another qualification is that the location of agenda-setting and veto powers does not affect the 
score, so far as the members’ right to participation and their right to decision-making in a given 
process are not negatively affected. If one was to address where agenda-setting powers lie in such 
processes as deciding the party platform, then there are important differences between Marxist-
Leninist parties, such as the KKE, AKEL, SP and PCP1 and parties, such as VAS in Finland2. The 
differences, however, do not affect the right of members to consult or cast a final vote on the 
platform and thus do not change the degree of formal inclusiveness. Yet they do determine how 
essential and substantive members’ input is opposite the final outcome. Overall, the index ‘saves’ 
some parties from lower scores (such as the KKE, AKEL, SP and Podemos), while 
‘downgrading’ others, such as the Scandinavian cases. Accordingly, distinctions across the 
typologies would be modified with alternative conceptualisations of participation. Nevertheless, 
CPs are still differentiated from others beyond the issue of centralisation. Finally, the observed 
patterns of participation have to be nuanced also in the light of research suggesting that privileges 
 
1 Where, typically, in drafting the electoral platform, for example, the central leadership prepares a draft, which is then 
amended or approved by the Central Committee, sent to the party branches for discussion and returned to the Central 
Committee or Congress to be finalised. 
2For example, the manifesto for the April 2019 elections was prepared at several public meetings arranged in 





to members may be manipulated by leaderships (Ignazi 2018, 4). If this is the case then more 
rights for members or blurred membership boundaries may signal more leadership autonomy 
(Scarrow 1999). 
Responsiveness and transparency are less markedly different across the sides of the first 
typology. Across the traditional/new left distinction, responsiveness is differentiated the most. 
The numerical difference between the averages can be explained by the very high scores on 
responsiveness by parties which emphasise new politics issues (the Red-Greens and New Left). 
Such issues include democracy of course, and (as in the Scandinavian parties) frequent debates 
over party statutes looking for democratic innovation are the norm. Otherwise, it shouldn’t make 
a difference if a party is orthodox or not as to how transparent and responsive it is. Overall, H(2) 
is partly confirmed as ideological differences are associated with some dimensions of IPD 
(participation and less so competition) but not others (representation, transparency and 
responsiveness).  
As per alleged populists opposite non-populists, we can already observe that the distinction 
does not hold. The Scandinavia RLPs are equally democratic as Podemos, which embodies also 
hierarchical/vertical structures that endow the leader with control over the party (Gerbaudo 2019). 
While SYRIZA, considered as an archetypical case of left populism, scores slightly higher than 
the CPs, but its internal organisation has been affected by government office (Spourdalakis and 
Eleftheriou 2019). Even on the principle of inclusion through participation rights, so called 
populist RLPs differ between them. SYRIZA, for example, scores quite lower than Podemos, 
while inclusiveness is more consistently higher among red-green formations. The SP typically 
considered populist as well, ranks below the ‘new left’, but above the communists and SYRIZA, 
since its organisation carries a Maoist, mass party structure. Indeed, the CPs, although ranking 
below the rest, score high on participation. Overall, there are no grounds to strictly associate 
Populist Radical Left Parties (PRLPs) as identified in the extant literature with intra-party 
democracy. 
In Table 4, organisational differences are also considered. Specifically whether a party is a 
unitary structure (AKEL, PCP, KKE, PG, PCF, SP, SV, KSCM), or formed as a coalition party 
(with subsequent trajectories of either retaining the parties or maintaining factions; VAS, Die 
Linke, Podemos, IU and Bloco, the Red-Green Alliance, SYRIZA); and a party’s membership 
strength, defined as its share of the total number of party members in a country. As expected by 
the third hypothesis (H3a), membership strength is unrelated to IPD, both on average and in terms 
of each of the IPD dimensions, which suggests that democratic deficits are not greater in RLPs 
with high party membership. In this sense, at least on the European radical left, the declining of 
party membership is probably not a cause of potentially higher or lower IPD than before.  
In table 4 one can also see that the intra-radical-left distinction between unitary parties and 
party coalitions is significant only in the dimension of representation. Unitary parties are much 
less representative, on average, and to a lesser extent less competitive, than party coalitions or 
parties with factions. There is good reason to believe, however, that whether a party is unitary or 
not cannot be clearly associated with its representative capacities. Certainly, factions in political 
parties perform, among other things, the articulation of issue-oriented interests and the 
representation of certain socio-political and sectoral interest groups (Beller and Belloni 1978). 
But most of the non-unitary parties are also RLPs of the ‘new/reformed’ or ‘red-green left’, 
broadly the democratic socialist strain and most of the unitary parties are ‘orthodox’ or 
‘traditional’, or ‘left of social democracy’ RLPs, which have not typically followed logics of 
descriptive (demographic) representation. As far as the argument goes, whether strong or soft 
representational quotas are used or not (which is what the index measures) appears to be related 
to a party’s guiding ideas about substantive equality and representation and only by this relation 
to the structure of the party body. Although not statistically significant, competition could also be 
directly linked to ideological pluralism; given more voices about ideas and policies, there is more 
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political ground for competitive electoral processes. In sum, there is interplay between ideology 
as a conditioning factor of IPD and party body structure as an intermediary variable, entrenched 
itself in ideology. Hypothesis 3b is largely corroborated.  
Turning to the issue of dimensionality, do the conceptual distinctions between the five 
dimensions of IPD hold empirically? The relatively weak Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
indicate that the sub-indices tap into separate dimensions, in line with the argument that all 
dimensions need to be included when measuring IPD. Clearly the five dimensions of IPD are 
largely unrelated to each other on the European radical left, with the exception of representation-
competition and transparency-competition. Radical left organisational practice does not preclude 
being more democratic in some dimensions and less democratic in the others. The relations 
between the IPD dimensions, as provided in Table 5 showing Pearson’s correlations, cannot be 
interpreted through existing theories about IPD in general3.  
 
         Table 5 Relationships between the five dimensions of IPD in European radical left parties (Pearson Correlation, p, 0.05) 
  Participation Representation Competition Responsiveness Transparency 
Participation   0.511 0.374 0.282 0.107 
Representation 0.511   0.721** 0.186 0.323 
Competition 0.374 0.721**   0.049 0.595* 
Responsiveness 0.282 0.186 0.049   0.010 
Transparency 0.107 0.323 0.595* 0.010   
Membership -0.083 -0.278 0.094 -0.133 0.264 
Note: Computed correlation used pearson-method with listwise-deletion                                                                                                                 
*Statistically significant results with asterisk 
Neither is participation significantly related to representation, competition and responsiveness 
in a negative way, nor are transparency and representation related between them more than to the 
other dimensions. The logic of inclusiveness as hindrance to representative lists does not appear 
to stand. Parties such as VAS and Podemos or IU embrace participatory politics and ensure high 
levels of representation (as measured by the index) at one and the same time. Their espousal of 
left-wing libertarianism leads them to support both top-down, direct democracy and pursue an 
agenda of descriptive representation and minority rights. Indeed, the observed patterns of the little 
association that exists can perhaps only be rationalised by considering, not parties in general, but 
RLPs and ideology in particular; while factoring in diverging preferences on representation and 
competition, between different types of RLPs. In support of the fourth hypothesis (H4), this 
rationalisation can account for the positive association observed between representation and 





This study has sought to lay out and explain patterns of IPD inside the European radical left, 
positioning RLPs against typical standards of liberal state-level democracy, as captured and 
 





measured by the Rahat and Shapira (2017) index. Three underlying research questions have 
driven the study, about the standing and variation of IPD in today’s European radical left, the 
inter-play between the theoretical dimensions of IPD and potential explanations therein.  
One can ascertain that on average the European radical left is not an illiberal force from an 
organisational perspective, as it follows the standard and widely performed practices of IPD that 
characterise mainstream party families across Europe and beyond. Out of the five IPD 
dimensions, only descriptive representation seems to exhibit low levels of IPD, suggesting that 
the European radical left, old and new, has not internalised (or rejects), in large part, the notion of 
descriptive representation, at least beyond women and (in some cases) the young and ethnic 
minorities. Still, this is by all means a very strong test to pass for most parties of any family, most 
of which do not use quotas for anything more than gender.  
In retrospect, we have shown that what is often treated as illiberalism and anti-establishment 
politics in its various forms within the left cannot suggest illiberal party organisations. While at 
the same time, as we know well by now, illiberalism on the radical right reflects preferences for 
vertical bureaucratic models, inscribed by respect for authority and nationalist or racist positions, 
which inhibit inclusiveness (Gauja, 2016: Chapter 6). This combined knowledge significantly 
nuances the ‘illiberalism thesis’ as it highlights yet another major difference between the radical 
left and the radical right; in terms of IPD.  
Concerning the centrist parties of the left and right, comparison through the index is in lieu at 
this point but based on previous broad comparisons (Poguntke et al. 2016), many mainstream 
actors (social democrats, conservatives, Christian democrats or liberals) are at best only slightly 
higher or equal with RLPs in terms of these principles. Indeed, given the index used so far for 
such comparisons is the one of the PPDB project – which measures inclusiveness –, it can be 
assumed that differences could be lower or in some cases reverse using the Rahat and Shapira 
index. As per populism’s application to RLP organisation, if there is validity in distinguishing 
between populist RLPs and non-populist RLPs in terms of ideology and discourse then this is not 
relevant for IPD. This can be a warning opposite the easy utilisation of the phenomenon as 
explanatory variable for party structure and competition on the left.  
IPD within the radical left is relatively high, but it is also differentiated between the older, 
traditional, communist parties and the reformed or ‘new left’ parties, in what concerns 
representation and (to a lesser extent) competition. Historical, path-dependent behavior seems to 
be an important feature of the trajectory of organisational practice among RLPs; the fault lines of 
the 1960s and 1970s events, apparently a critical juncture for the socialist movement, are today 
still somewhat relevant. Organisational principles of democracy correspond to the sides of 
historical fault lines within the party family. Party structural features that are associated with IPD 
are fed into by ideological division lines. In this sense party ideology is a key determinant of the 
existing variation among RLPs in terms of democratic practice, although such variation is limited 
in its scope. The structure of the party body or membership strength does not significantly affect 
IPD; the former feeds into different patterns of IPD but it is still, by and large, an implication of 
ideological/historical divisions within the party family. 
The variation in IPD and across its dimensions can be subsequently linked by future literature 
to relations to social movements, and bottom-up linkage. We can assume that parties with high 
participation opportunities for ‘outsiders’ or blurry membership boundaries or quotas of 
descriptive representation can facilitate or are the product of the engagement of certain groups 
(e.g. feminist or immigrant associations) with the party. Further research can examine patterns of 
IPD in RLPs in more detail, for example, across the distinction between formal rules and informal 
practice; using measures of ‘radical’, rather than ‘liberal’ democracy; or in relation to the history 
and politics of decentralization initiatives.  Taking this study further in debates about IPD and 
party organisation and in the context of evidence supporting the ‘de-ideologisation’ of party 
politics, it would be worth considering whether in settings where ideology is historically 
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important in terms of intra-party family cleavages, as in the radical left, it is a stronger predictor 
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The modified Rahat and Shapira Index and coding specifications4 
(1) Participation (30 pts)  
1.1 Who selects the party leader? (5 pts)5 
(5 pts) A group of elected representatives (central committee, council or convention), all party 
members or all citizens of voting age  
(0 pts) A small inner circle of the party elite or a single leader  
 
1.2 Who selects the party leader? (5 pts)6 
(5 pts) All citizens of voting age  
(4 pts) All party members  
(3 pts) Selected representatives 
(1 pt) A small inner circle  
(0 pts) A single leader  
 
4 This is the final, revised version of Rahat and Shapira (2017), as used to collect data. Scoring has been updated up 
to July 2019. 
5 Questions 1.1 – 1.5 reflect who can cast a final vote in the party leader selection process, the candidate selection 
process and the party platform or manifesto, respectively. At the same time, involvement in the consultation of an issue 
is taken into consideration for the final score and given 0.5 points. If the selection of the party leader is a two-tier 
process, whereby a pre-election by all members is organised before the party congress, and then the congress or another 
representative body cast a vote under moral pressure by the outcome of the first round, then a score of 3.5 was given. If 
friends of the party are entitled to a final vote, but not all citizens, then a score of 4.5 was given. If all members are 
allowed to cast a vote but membership obligations are almost inexistent (as in Podemos), then a score of 4.8 was given.  
Some parties, such as Die Linke, have dual leaderships and some others collectives with spokespersons. In the latter 
case, the date of the election of the leadership body is taken into consideration rather than of the appointment of the 
spokesperson, which may not be the same. Only if there is no statutory commitment to representative selection, are 1 or 
0 coded, except in the PG, where the national secretariat which is elected by Congress leads the party but the two 
spokespeople of that body are only decided from within it. Meanwhile political power is contested via France 
Insoumise, led by Jean Luke Melenchon, who used to be the leader of the PG. A score of 5 was given to question 1, and 
a score of 1 in question 2, because the party leadership selection process resembles features of both representative 
selection and inner circle and single leader workings. The Left Bloc was scored with 2.5 in question 2, since in the 
selection of its collective leadership prevail the four founding tendencies and their leaders enjoy autonomy. 
Note on sources: Scoring was based on party statutes, cross-checked with Political Party Database (PPDB) data (for 
the cases this was available).  
 
6 Selected representatives may include ‘council, central committee or congress. A small inner circle refers to the 
executive (such as general secretariats, executive councils, chairman and vice-chairmen or other small coordinating 
groups running the party’s daily affairs). 
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1.3 Who selects the party’s candidates to the national parliament? (5 pts)7  
(5 pts) A group of selected representatives, all party members or all citizens of voting age 
(0 pts) A small inner circle of the party elite or a single leader  
 
1.4 Who selects the party’s candidates to the parliament? (5 pts) 
(5 pts) All citizens of voting age  
(4 pts) All party members  
(3 pts) Selected representatives  
(1 pts) A small inner circle  
(0 pts) A single leader  
 
1.5 Who of the following can participate in writing or approving the party electoral 
platform? (5 pts) 8 
(5 pts) All citizens of voting age  
(4 pts) All party members  
(3 pts) Selected representatives  
(2 pts) A small inner circle 
(1 pts) A single leader  
(0 pts) The party doesn’t have a platform  
 
1.6 Who of the following could take part in ideological, identity or policy debates conducted 
by the party in the last four years? (5 pts)9  
(5 pts) All citizens of voting age  
(4 pts) All party members  
(3 pts) Selected representatives  
(0 pts) The party didn’t conduct such debates  
 
(2) Representation (20 pts)   
2.1 What is the proportion of women elected by the party in the last, national parliamentary 
elections? (5 pts)10 
 
7 If members or party friends participate in discussing and nominating the candidate list but do not have a final vote 
directly at a mass level, then a score of 3.5 is assigned. If they do have a vote at the mass level then a score of 4 is 
assigned. If in the candidate selection process the leader has a significant say on the final list, shouldn’t make a a 
difference as to selected representatives’ right to vote on the list and members’s right of participating in nominating and 
approving. Centralisation is thus not strictly measured. As long as only a minority of candidates, are selected by the 
leader, it does not have an effect on the score. 
Note on sources: Scoring was based on party statutes, cross-checked with PPDB data (for the cases this was 
available).   
8 If a party has a platform or a document presenting basic principles, but it is not known who wrote it or ratified it, 
then the document is considered to have been written by a ‘small group’. If members or party friends participate in 
discussing and modifying the platform but do not have a final vote directly at a mass level, then a score of 3.5 is 
assigned. A platform is not necessarily in view of an election. If the manifesto drafting process starts from above (for 
example, the central committee or party council approve an initial draft but then members debate it before it is amended 
and approved by the party council or the party congress), shouldn’t make a difference as to the right of consultation or 
decision, and thus whether the manifesto is centrally drafted is not taken into consideration.  
Note on sources: Scoring was based on party statutes, cross-checked with PPDB data (for the cases this was 
available). 
9 Such debates usually take place before the party’s regular congress. If the dialogue is explicitly open to anyone 
that wants to voice or submit a view but in practice, contributors to this public debate are party members and 
intellectuals or critical citizens close to the party, the score here is still 5, because of the intention rather than the 
outcome which is the result of informal partisan life. If formally organised debates and dialogue are open to ‘friends’ or 
‘sympathisers’, then a score of 4.5 is given.  





(5 pts) 45% – 
(4 pts) 35 –44%  
(3 pts) 25 –34%  
(2 pts) 15 –24%  
(1 pts) 5 –14%  
(0 pts) 0 –4% 
 
2.2 What is the proportion of women elected by the party in the national parliamentary 
elections before that? (5 pts) 
(5 pts) 45% –  
(4 pts) 35 –44%  
(3 pts) 25 –34%  
(2 pts) 15 –24%  
(1 pts) 5 –14%  
(0 pts) 0 –4% 
 
2.3 Does the party employ special mechanisms to guarantee representation for the following 
social groups or sectors on its parliament list? (10 pts)11  
(2 pts) Women  
(2 pts) Immigrants/Ethnic minorities 
(2 pts) Senior citizens  
(2 pts) Young adults  
(2 pts) Residents of the geographical periphery  
 
(3) Competition (20 pts)  
3.1 Have there been competitive elections (with two or more candidates) for the position of 
party leader since the penultimate general elections? (10 pts)12  
(10 pts) Yes  
(0 pts) No  
 
3.2 Have there been competitive elections (with two or more candidates) for the party 
institutions (convention, council or central committee) during the last four years? (10 pts)  
(10 pts) Yes  
(0 pts) No  
 
 
10 If the party ran as part of a coalition, then the percentage is calculated on the basis of the coalition’s electoral list, 
not the party’s own candidates.  
Note on sources: Ministries of Interior official election results or Parliaments’ websites. 
 
 
11 Voluntary party measures may range from recommendations and general goals (or ‘soft’ quotas) to mandatory 
rules and requirements such as alternating male and female names on the party list (also known as the zipper system) or 
having a minimum percentage for the representation of a group. In the case of ‘strong’ quotas for electoral districts a 
positive score is assigned independent of whether these special mechanisms exist at the party level or because of the 
national electoral system. A score of 1 is given to ‘soft quotas’, or ‘an assumed logic of selection’ as reflected in the 
presence of women leaders, and a score of 2 is given to ‘strong quotas’, such as reserved positions. Informal, election to 
election considerations of how to fit in this or that group are not scored in the absence of the above indicators.  
Note on source: Keith and Verge (2017); Party statutes cross tabulated with PPDP (Political Party Database Project) 
data and national electoral systems. 
12 Election of party leadership at the congress or Central Committee/Council. 
Note on sources: Expert information, party websites and online media. 
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(4) Responsiveness (15 pts)  
 
4.1 Does the party have an elected representative institution and has it met at least once in 
the last two years? (5 pts)13  
(5 pts) Yes  
(0 pts) No  
 
4.2 Do the party’s elected institutions or members do the following? (10 pts)14 
(4 pts) Take part in selecting the party’s representatives in the national cabinet 
(3 pts) Approve whether the party joins, supports or leaves a government coalition at the national 
level 
(3 pts) Conduct debates about policy-relevant matters 
 
(5) Transparency (15 pts)  
5.1 Are the following available on the party’s website and/or Facebook page? (15 pts) 15 
(3 pts) Information about the party’s finances16 
(3 pts) The party’s constitution or regulations  
(3 pts) The party’s platform or document of principles  
(1 pts) Information about the party’s history  
(1 pts) Biographies of the party’s parliamentary members and or candidates  
(1 pts) A list of party officials and their contact details  
(1 pts) Documentation of party events  
(1 pts) Articles or transcripts of speeches by party representatives and officials  





13 Elected representative institutions refer to the Council or Central Committee of parties. 
Note on sources: Experts cross-checked with internet/media sources. 
14 Deciding on joining or leaving a coalition concerns the national level. Some parties, for example, VAS and PCF 
have held primaries for supporting a candidacy/entering a coalition. 
Note on sources: Party statutes cross tabulated with PPDB data. 
15 If an item is made up of two parts, then each is scored by 0.5 point. 
Note on sources: Search of party websites/Facebook  pages 
16 Different national practices take one point in so far some information is given about income, income sources and 
expenses. 
